A. INTRODUCTION
The doctrinal nature of an owner's right to recover possession of moveable property, and the extent to which it rests on proprietary right as opposed to personal obligation, has long been a topic of some complexity in Scots law. 1 This can be attributed in no contended, substantiates Ford's thesis regarding his willingness to depart from learned authority. 6 A further important feature of Stair's work is his concern to provide a justificatory account of the development of private property and his engagement with the right to recover as a question the answering of which requires more than an application of learned authority. The philosophical move from property to obligation, from a relation between a person and a thing to a relation between people, preoccupied both Stair and one of his most obvious and significant influences in this area, Hugo Grotius. It is argued that Stair's view of vindication is informed by a morally and theologically rich understanding of ownership that focussed on the creation of a sphere of individually protected rights rather than the strictures of the Roman distinction between property and obligation.
B. BEFORE STAIR: HOPE, SPOTTISWOODE AND CIVILIAN

LEARNING (1) Hope's Practicks
This section affirms the influence of Civilian terminology and concepts on the way the Scots jurists of the early seventeenth century understood the recovery of moveables. The Roman action for the recovery of a thing, the rei vindicatio, 7 had several significant features. The action lay only against the possessor, 8 and gave a right to recovery based upon proof of ownership: "[f]or once I have proved that the thing is mine, the possessor will have to deliver it to me". 9 In contrast to systems which require a wrong before the owner can assert his or her right, the vindicatio was available against any possessor, whether in good or bad faith. 10 The distinction between actions in rem (against the thing itself) and those in personam (against a specified person) emerges from the structure of the vindicatio: in contrast to an action in personam, the possessor was not personally liable for the return of the thing and could not be forced to defend the action. 11 This might, in theory, mean that the rei vindicatio could not be tried. For this reason, in respect of moveable property the praetor granted the actio ad exhibendum, 12 by means of which the plaintiff could demand the production of the thing. 13 If the defendant failed to comply, he or she was condemned to pay the value of the thing as assessed by the plaintiff. 14 Even where the thing was produced, the difficulties of proving ownership meant that it was often preferable to use the possessory interdicts to gain possession, placing the burden of proof on the other party who would then be forced to bring his or her own vindicatio.
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Prior to the publication of the first printed edition of Stair' real action (actio realis), which is given to the owner against any possessor in order to recover his corporeal thing. 36 If the defender denies that he is the possessor, he is not compelled to submit to judgment, but the actio ad exhibendum will be competent against him for production of the thing. 37 An owner wishing to vindicate his thing is better off trying to obtain possession through one of the possessory interdicts available, as it is difficult to prove ownership. 38 Although adjusted to incorporate feudal landholdings, 39 the basic structure of the action described is thus that of the Roman law set out above. Spottiswoode's collection does not, in itself, demonstrate reception of the vindicatio in Scotland but it nevertheless provides a further indication of influence of the Civilian distinction between real and personal actions and, by implication, Civilian concepts of ownership and possession.
(3) Use of Civilian terminology
Given Stair's contention that neither the name nor the nature of the vindicatio is recognised in Scotland, it is interesting that prior to the publication of the first printed edition of the Institutions in 1681 there are numerous case reports which make reference to recovery of a thing "rei vindicatione". 40 As early as 1566 a ship was 33 Cairns, "Ius Civile" (n 17) at 167. 34 The first paragraph and the final one of the title on "Rei Vindicatio" correspond more or less word for word with that of J Mynsinger's Apotelesma sive corpus perfectum scholiorum ad quattuor libros institutionum iuris civilis (1589) 4.6 §Omnium 30. The correspondence of the middle paragraph is less exact but it appears to be based on Mynsinger, Apotelesma 4.6 §Omnium 35. 35 39 There are said to be two kinds of rei vindicatio, directa and utilis. These are competent to the superior and the vassal respectively: Spottiswoode, Practicks (n 36) 275. 40 claimed "per rei vindicationem" from the possessors; the defence that the defenders had been imprisoned on the ship by pirates and had "hazardit their lyves" to bring it safely to port failed to convince the court that they should be allowed to keep it. 41 Of particular significance is Lord Durie's report of Brown v Hudelstone 42 which refers to the owner's right to vindicate "à quocunqe fuerit possessa". 43 Brown concerned an accusation of spuilzie (a delictual claim for recovery based on wrongful dispossession) 44 against a creditor who had poinded cattle not owned by his debtor.
The Lords found the debtor's two years of possession to be a good defence against spuilzie and also against the claim for delivery of the cow (rei vindicatione). 45 The scope of the owner's right to follow the thing is ambiguous: it is stated that the original owner would continue to have an action for restitution of the cow against the person who "received" it but it is unclear whether this refers to some subsisting right to recover the cow itself, or, as seems more likely, a personal claim against the person to whom the cow had originally been entrusted. As will be seen, the term "restitution" appears to encompass both an action for recovery of the thing and a personal claim to compensation for an unjustly received benefit.
C. THE FIRST PRINTED EDITION OF THE INSTITUTIONS (1) Stair's Account of Restitution
Stair presents an account of property rights that is both responsive to and yet distinct 43 "From whoever should be in possession". 44 On the development of spuilzie as a distinct form of possessory remedy in the sixteenth century, see M Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland: The Origins of a Central Court (2009) 244-245. 45 The decision seems to be based on a form of short acquisitive prescription rather than an evidential presumption from possession. Durie's commentary refers to the effect of the decision being that "for two years possession the possessor should be counted proprietor and owner". For an argument that the decision in Brown does represent an embryonic form of the presumption of ownership from possession, see A Simpson, "Positive Prescription of Moveables in Scots Law" (2009) 63 Rather than attempting to resolve this question, it is argued below that it was irrelevant to Stair's philosophical project to differentiate the unjustified acquisition of a right in a thing from the mere possession of that which is another's.
Like the vindicatio, the obligation to restore is closely connected to possession of the thing in question. 64 Once no longer in possession, the former possessor may be liable for any profits on the basis of recompense 65 but is no longer liable for the value of the thing itself. 66 There is an exception for fruits that have been consumed in good faith. 67 The obligation is owed to the rightful owner, rather than a party who has no right such as a robber. 68 The question of whether it would ever be appropriate to restore on the basis of an entitlement other than ownership is not explicitly addressed.
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From the "right of restitution" arises the action of exhibition and delivery, which involves the conveyance of any moveable thing, frequently writings, before a judge, where questions of right can be decided and delivery to the pursuer ordered.
70
62 Corporeal Moveables (n 1) 235. 63 See e.g. Reid, "Unjustified Enrichment" (n 1); Evans Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (n 54) paras 1.12-1.13 and ch 2. 64 Stair, Institutions (1681) 7.2; 7.11. Although the obligation can, in some cases, continue after the possessor has parted with the thing (see 7.13), possession appears to play a crucial role and makes the obligation "more palpable". This is broadly in accordance with the traditional Scholastic approach, see J Hallebeek, "But not to dwell too long in enumerating the different classes, we know that all the arts by which we obtain possession of the goods and money of our neighbours, for sincere affection substituting an eagerness to deceive or injure them in any way, are to be regarded as thefts. Though they may be obtained by an action at law, a different decision is given by God." 77 Ibid. 78 The possible influence of a Scottish Calvinist tradition is discussed at G(2) below. There is a tension between the moral obligation of restitution and the need to protect commerce in moveable property, which may be transferred with very little in the way of evidence. Although Stair's formulation of a presumption of ownership in favour of the possessor 91 goes some way towards resolving this, relieving bona fide transferees of the need to establish their right, acquirers remain vulnerable to the loss of the property. The natural law understanding of property does not necessarily, however, imply that ownership must be absolutely protected. As laws of property developed in conjunction with, and for the benefit of, human society, they can be modified or restricted where this will be of public benefit. 92 Stair sets out that, for reasons of public expediency, the doctrine that transfer requires the owner's consent may be departed from:
albeit it be a good and solide rule, Quod meum est, sine me alienum fieri nequit, yet it hath the exception of publick sanction, or common custom, and so though it be not by the sole and proper consent of the owner, yet it is by the Interestingly, this passage is far more reminiscent of Grotius' account of property as both flexible and a product of human society than the earlier description of restitution. 94 It leaves space for the development of rules protecting bona fide purchasers, particularly where this is required for the public good. Indeed, Stair's account of the presumption of ownership from possession further emphasises the role of custom in modifying rules "destructive to commerce".
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D. MACKENZIE'S INSTITUTIONS
The other important, although less comprehensive, general work of the period, 96 the
Institutions of Sir George Mackenzie, begins with a statement of the "great influence"
of the Civil law in Scotland, "except where Our own express Laws, or Customes, have receded from it". 97 In the first printed edition, Mackenzie does not discuss the obligation of restitution. His treatment of bona fide possession, although brief, is predicated on the assumption that the true owner can always recover the actual thing. 98 His description of a real action as "that whereby a Man pursues his Right against all singular Successors, as well as the person who was first obliged" would fit the vindicatio. 99 The only reference to the Scots procedure for claiming moveable property is the description of the action for exhibition and delivery, which is in similar terms to that of Stair. 100 It is implied that the pursuer in this action may crave delivery of moveable property, but no further detail is given.
However, in the 1688 edition of the Institutions, the Scots definition of a real action based on its availability against successors is contrasted with the "Civil law"
definition of a real action as arising from a real right and founded in dominium or property, the prime example being the rei vindicatio. 101 This change may reflect a desire to distinguish the Scots action for recovery from the Roman action founded in ownership, but it is not entirely clear.
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E. MACKENZIE'S TREATISE ON ACTIONS
The most significant indication of the disparity between Stair's view and the more On this account, the term "vindication" is indeed recognised in Scots law, and, moreover, an action for recovery of moveables is "in effect a Declarator of Property"
and hence amounts to a vindication. As will be seen, this is in direct contradiction to both facets of Stair's pronouncement: both the name and the nature of vindication are after all part of Scots legal discourse. Reference is made to Hope's account of real rights, and the nature of the real right is expressly linked to the action it produces. 108 Mackenzie considers what is necessary to prove ownership and concludes that, certainly on the part of the pursuer in an action of rei vindicatio, it will not be enough for the pursuer simply to libel that he or she was in possession, this is only appropriate in a case of spuilzie. 109 He discusses Ramsay v Wilson 110 as reported by Stair and, although he does not expressly deny the existence of a presumption of ownership from possession, 111 he criticises the decision for attending to the wrong facts.
Consistent with an orthodox Civilian analysis, he identifies the main issues as being the location of ownership and the circumstances of the defender's acquisition. is designed to ensure that a possessor is, as might be expected from the perspective of moral obligation, personally bound to restore.
F. THE SECOND PRINTED EDITION OF THE INSTITUTIONS
A further significant addition is the clarification that the obligation to restore does not only extend to restoration to the owner but also to the "Lawful Possessor".
119
This moves the action for recovery firmly away from the vindicatio's basis in ownership and contrasts with the fundamental character of the restitutionary obligation set out by Grotius and even that described by Stair in the 1681 edition of the Institutions. The action for recovery of moveable property is therefore not a real action; 120 it is best characterised as a petitory action where something is sought from the defender. 121 An action based on the right of ownership would be a declaratory action, whereas the action for delivery can proceed from any right giving "Title and
Interest" in recovery of the thing.
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The claim that "we make not use of the name or nature of Vindication" is particularly surprising. inextricably linked with conceptions of human nature and society, of psychology and history, of action and obligation". 148 Although Mackenzie has been argued also to have written from a standpoint that was both "rational and religious", 149 one of the points which emerges from comparison of their views on restitution is that Stair was undertaking justificatory work which Mackenzie was not. It has been seen that both
Stair and Grotius tied their account of restitution to a narrative about the origin of property and ownership. The idea of a "golden age" in which there was no private
property in land appears to have long been a preoccupation of Stair's. 150 Stair's understanding of the development of private property as simultaneously a timeless and divinely mandated yet also historically conditioned process 151 is inseparable from his approach to legal authority and the precedence given to equity expressed in local custom "wrung out from the debates upon particular cases" 152 over fidelity to the
